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IT’S “EXHAUSTING”: RECONCILING A PRISONER’S RIGHT 
TO MEANINGFUL REMEDIES FOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
VIOLATIONS WITH THE NEED FOR AGENCY AUTONOMY 
Allen E. Honick* 
“If we are to keep our democracy there must be one 
commandment:  Thou shalt not ration justice.”1 
“The degree of civilization in a society can be judged by 
entering its prisons.”2 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States imprisons more people than any other nation.3  
With more than 2.4 million prisoners, the American prison 
population outnumbers those of all European countries combined.4  
Behind the new “iron curtain” exists a hidden world in which 
conditions are abhorrent, basic human rights are unprotected, and 
meaningful opportunities for redress are almost non-existent.  As the 
national conversation centers on the effectiveness and sustainability 
of mass incarceration,5 this Comment highlights a less examined, but 
equally important, aspect of the incarceration problem—the lack of 
meaningful remedies for prisoners whose civil rights have been 
violated.  The single biggest obstacle in the way of vindicating 
 * Allen E. Honick, Editor, Volume 45, University of Baltimore Law Review.  J.D.
Candidate, 2016, University of Baltimore School of Law; B.A., 2013, Stevenson
University.  I am grateful to Professor Colin P. Starger for his thoughtful guidance and
advice with this Comment.
1. Chief Judge Learned Hand, 75th Anniversary Address to the Legal Aid Society of
New York (Feb. 16, 1951).
2. FYODOR DOSTOYEVSKY, THE HOUSE OF THE DEAD (Constance Garnett trans., 1861).
3. Peter Wagner & Leah Sakala, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie, PRISON POL’Y 
INITIATIVE (Mar. 12, 2014), http://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie.html.
4. See World Prison Populations, BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/uk/06/priso
ns/html/nn1page1.stm (last visited Nov. 13, 2015).  China has a population nearly 10
times the size of the Unites States, yet incarcerates almost one million fewer citizens.
Id.
5. E.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE
OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010).
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constitutional rights is the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA),6 
and the judicially imposed restrictions engrafted since its enactment.7 
This Comment will address the inadequacy and injustice of the 
PLRA, specifically the “proper exhaustion” rule as expressed in 
Woodford v. Ngo.8  “Proper exhaustion” means that “a prisoner must 
complete the administrative review process in accordance with 
applicable procedural rules, including deadlines, as a precondition to 
bringing suit in federal court.”9  Failure to adhere to even the slightest 
procedural requirement is sufficient to warrant procedural default, 
i.e., a dismissal regardless of the merits of the underlying claim.10
The PLRA seeks to achieve laudable ends, but the means by which it 
does so leave much to be desired. 
I do not present here a study of the reasons for an individual’s 
incarceration, but I focus, instead, on the difficulties an incarcerated 
individual faces in efforts to have a grievance decided on the merits.11  
Further, rather than critique the inequities and shortcomings in the 
criminal justice system as a whole, I examine the experience of life 
behind bars, and suggest how constitutional rights and protections 
can be guaranteed to those in prison.12  For present purposes, I 
presume that those currently incarcerated are thus situated because 
they committed a crime for which they were duly tried and convicted, 
and are now serving a sentence imposed according to due process. 
“Imprisonment” by definition means the loss of certain aspects of 
liberty,13 but it is not a blanket removal of all constitutional rights.14  
Prisoners retain substantive rights under the First Amendment 
(freedom of speech, religion, and access to the courts),15 the Fifth and 
 6. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2012 & Supp. I 2013).
 7. See infra Part II.C.
 8. 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006).  Proper exhaustion and the consequence of procedural default
differs from ordinary administrative exhaustion in that the latter only requires a
claimant to present a complaint to an administrative agency prior to filing suit with
dismissal of that claim having no bearing on future ability to file suit, whereas
procedural default dictates that if a complaint is dismissed for failure to comply with
procedural guidelines, a court can never consider that claim.
 9. Id. at 88.
 10. See infra Part III.C.
 11. See infra Parts I–IV.
 12. See infra Parts I–IV.
 13. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 225 (2005).  Prisoners do retain nominal liberty
interests, such as the interest in avoiding solitary confinement, when that classification
“imposes an atypical and significant hardship under any plausible baseline.”  Id. at
223. 
 14. See infra Part I.A.
 15. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321–22 (1972) (per curiam); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S.
546 (1964) (per curiam).
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Fourteenth Amendments (due process and equal protection),16 and the 
Eighth Amendment (protection against cruel and unusual 
punishment),17 to name a few.  Nor is incarceration a relinquishment 
of citizenship.18  Thus, the privileges guaranteed to citizens, other 
than basic liberty interests, must also be ensured for prisoners. 
This Comment begins, in Part I, by examining the history of 
redressing constitutional violations in prison.  To properly understand 
the current state of affairs regarding prisoner civil rights actions, it is 
necessary to first explore the institutional framework for prisoner 
complaints, and the rationale behind its creation and implementation.  
Part I traces the history leading up to the PLRA, and the fundamental 
deficiency in the motivation and rationale offered for the PLRA’s 
enactment. 
Part II focuses on the specifics of the PLRA, what it requires of 
prisoner litigants, and how the PLRA fundamentally altered a 
prisoner’s ability to bring a constitutional claim in federal court.  
Exhaustion of administrative remedies is examined as developed in 
the seven Supreme Court decisions since the PLRA’s enactment.19  
The judicial gloss of proper exhaustion and the consequence of 
procedural default articulated by the Supreme Court is the primary 
inquiry.20  Procedural default, I argue, is the most significant barrier 
between a prisoner with a valid claim and the federal courts.21 
Part III begins by examining Justice Stevens’ dissent in Woodford, 
and its criticism of the majority’s rationale for 
engrafting into the PLRA proper exhaustion as an absolute 
requirement.  Proper exhaustion creates an inherent conflict of 
interests that undermines the PLRA’s intent.22  Prisoners wishing to 
complain, inter alia, about their treatment by staff are required to 
submit their grievances to the same officials who, often times, are 
defendants in the underlying action.23  These officials then have the 
incentive and the ability, based on the proper exhaustion doctrine, to 
procedurally default a claim, thereby reducing the likelihood of 
 16. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (per curiam); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404
U.S. 249 (1971) (per curiam); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 93–112 (1945).
 17. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349
(1910).
 18. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555–56 (1974).
 19. See discussion infra Parts II.B–C.
 20. See discussion infra Parts II.B–C.
 21. See infra Part II.B.
 22. See infra Part III.B.
 23. See infra Parts III.B–C.
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judicial intervention.24  Repealing or revising the exhaustion 
provision would be the most direct and effective method to remedy 
procedural default, but given the extreme difficulty this Congress 
seemingly has in passing any meaningful legislation,25 other solutions 
are explored.   
In Part IV, two proposals are offered.  The first involves a technical 
analysis of the proper exhaustion doctrinal underpinning, focusing on 
exceptions and loopholes built into the rule.  The key to the 
harmonious existence of proper exhaustion and meaningful redress 
lies in exceptions to the rule.  Justice Breyer’s concurrence in 
Woodford is explored, and the administrative law interpretative 
framework discussed therein is, I argue, the appropriate guidepost for 
federal courts analyzing and applying proper exhaustion under the 
PLRA.26  There is precedent for recognizing exceptions to proper 
exhaustion that should guide courts in their application of the 
PLRA’s exhaustion provision.27  This proposal is easily 
implementable and can take effect immediately. 
The second proposal involves a long term and more comprehensive 
policy analysis, addressing the sources of the majority of prisoner 
civil rights actions, and holding prison officials accountable for 
violations in their institutions.28  Given the inherently closed and 
secretive nature of prisons, a better system of checks and balances is 
necessary, taking into account the need for agency autonomy while 
still protecting constitutional rights.  Ongoing independent oversight 
can provide a preemptive problem-solving function instead of the 
current reactive model employed by the federal judiciary.  Although 
this proposal will take time, it provides a strong foundation for long 
term systemic changes in the American prison model. 
PART I 
The federal courts’ involvement in conditions of confinement has 
come full-circle.  From the Great Depression through the early 1960s, 
 
 24. See infra Part III.C. 
 25. See Rebecca Kaplan, Unpopular Congress Was Also Very Unproductive in 2013, 
CBSNEWS (Dec. 24, 2013, 11:19 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/unpopular-
congress-was-also-very-unproductive-in-2013/; Cristina Marcos, A ‘Do Nothing’ 
Congress?, THEHILL (July 13, 2014, 10:30 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-
action/212041-a-do-nothing-congress. 
 26. See infra Part IV.A. 
 27. See infra note 252 and accompanying text. 
 28. See infra Part IV.B. 
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federal courts took a “hands-off” approach,29 and did not interfere 
with conditions on the inside.30  Between 1961 and 1980, courts 
began affirmatively changing the way they dealt with allegations of 
constitutional violations.31  During this time, courts conferred 
substantive and procedural rights on prisoners, and it seemed as 
though the gates of this “shadow world” had swung open.32  Congress 
also became involved in securing the judicially declared rights, 
enacting legislation aimed at providing prisoners with meaningful 
avenues of redress for violations of these newly recognized rights.33  
Three decades of progress in prisoner rights began to unwind in 1996 
when Congress enacted the PLRA.34  Nearly twenty years later, 
prisoners again find themselves without adequate remedies for 
violations of the most basic civil rights.35  The PLRA and its 
accompanying jurisprudence have gradually eroded decades of 
progress in the prisoner rights arena.36 
A. “Hands Off” No More 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the classic vehicle for vindicating federal 
constitutional rights, and provides in part: 
Every person who, under color of any statute . . . custom, or 
usage of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, 
any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution 
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at 
 
 29. See, e.g., Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871).  Ruffin 
epitomized feelings of the federal bench toward prisoners and prison conditions, 
referring to prisoners as “slave[s] of the State.”  Id.  “The bill of rights is a declaration 
of general principles to govern a society of freemen, and not of convicted felons and 
men civilly dead.”  Id.  This attitude resulted in a “hands off” approach by federal 
courts, leaving prison conditions and prison complaints to the individual state 
agencies without judicial oversight.  Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979). 
 30. See MATT DELISI & PETER JOHN CONIS, AMERICAN CORRECTIONS: THEORY, 
RESEARCH, POLICY & PRACTICE 56 (2d ed. 2013). 
 31. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 562 (stating that “in recent years . . . [federal] courts largely have 
discarded this ‘hands off’ attitude” to the problems inside prisons “and have waded 
into this complex arena”). 
 32. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 354 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 33. See infra Part I.B. 
 34. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2012 & Supp. I 2013). 
 35. See infra Part III. 
 36. See infra Part III. 
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law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . 
. .37 
In 1961, the Supreme Court decided Monroe v. Pape,38 a case in 
which an African-American man was arrested following a 
warrantless search of his home, detained for more than ten hours 
without access to counsel, and subsequently released without being 
charged.39  The Court held that in passing Section 1983, Congress 
intended to provide “a remedy to parties deprived of constitutional 
rights, privileges and immunities by an official’s abuse of his 
position.”40  Section 1983 does not create a new cause of action, but 
provides a method for enforcing constitutional rights elsewhere 
established.41  Importantly, Section 1983 does not precondition the 
right to a constitutional claim in federal court on any procedural 
qualifications.42    
In 1964, the Supreme Court recognized a state prisoner’s 
unconditional right to bring a claim under Section 1983.43  The 
rationale behind the lack of procedural barriers was that an aggrieved 
prisoner should not be required to seek relief from the state 
authorities against whom Section 1983 guarantees immediate judicial 
access.44  This, of course, makes good sense, as in many if not most 
prisoner complaints these same prison officials are defendants in the 
ultimate action.45  Prisoners began filing federal claims under Section 
1983 to improve their conditions of confinement, and successfully 
 
 37. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); see also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171–85 (1961) 
(interpreting the original intent of Section 1983). 
 38. 365 U.S. at 167. 
 39. Id. at 169. 
 40. Id. at 172; see also Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 
106 (1989) (quoting Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 700–01 
(1978)) (holding that Section 1983 “provides a remedy ‘against all forms of official 
violation of federally protected rights’”). 
 41. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146 (1979) (holding that Section 1983 is not itself a 
source of substantive rights, but rather “imposes liability for violations of rights 
protected by the Constitution”). 
 42. Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 500–01 (1982).  The Patsy court explicitly 
noted:  “[T]his Court has stated categorically that exhaustion is not a prerequisite to an 
action under § 1983 . . . .”  Id.   
 43. Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (per curiam).  Federal prisoners were given a 
similar right to pursue constitutional claims against the federal government, since 
Section 1983 pertains only to state action.  See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents 
of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 390–91, 397–98 (1971). 
 44. DAVID FATHI, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: THE PRISON LITIGATION 
REFORM ACT IN THE UNITED STATES 11 (2009) (citing Patsy, 457 U.S. at 516). 
 45. Id. at 12. 
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secured numerous rights in a series of Supreme Court decisions 
between 1969 and 1976.46  Meaningful access to the courts,47 
religious freedom,48 procedural due process,49 equal protection from 
invidious racial discrimination,50 and adequate medical care51 were 
assured, reversing a century-old trend of federal courts remaining 
uninvolved in state prison conditions.52  In 1974, the Court declared:  
“There is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the 
prisoners of this country.”53 
Following Cooper, Section 1983 permitted prisoners to file federal 
claims for any allegation of constitutional violations, but in a speech 
to the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG), Chief 
Justice Warren Burger suggested that states implement an 
institutional grievance model as a method for prisoners to raise 
complaints without having to go to court: 
What we need is to supplement [judicial actions] with 
flexible, sensible working mechanisms adapted to the 
modern conditions of overcrowded and understaffed prisons 
. . . a simple and workable procedure by which every person 
in confinement who has, or thinks he has, a grievance or 
complaint can be heard promptly, fairly and fully.54 
B. State Grievance Systems – An Early Model 
In 1980, Congress followed Chief Justice Burger’s 
recommendation and endorsed, inter alia, the use of administrative 
prison grievance systems by passing the Civil Rights of 
 
 46. See cases cited infra notes 47–51. 
 47. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969) (“[I]t is fundamental that access of 
prisoners to the courts for the purpose of presenting their complaints may not be 
denied or obstructed.”). 
 48. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322–23 (1972) (per curiam). 
 49. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (per curiam).  A unanimous Court held that a 
prisoner’s pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less 
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” and can only be 
dismissed for failure to state a claim if “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can 
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”  Id. at 
520–21 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957)). 
 50. Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 333–34 (1968) (per curiam). 
 51. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).  
 52. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 53. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555–56 (1974). 
 54. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Speech to the National Association of Attorneys 
General in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 8, 1970) (emphasis supplied). 
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Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA).55  The purpose of the 
administrative grievance system format was to encourage settlement 
of prisoner disputes as an alternative to filing suit in federal court.56  
The CRIPA set forth minimum criteria for these systems, and 
required that each state’s grievance model be certified by either the 
U.S. Attorney General or a federal court.57  The CRIPA mandated 
that administrative remedies must be “plain, speedy, and effective.”58  
Exhaustion was added to the CRIPA to counterbalance other 
provisions in the Act which made it significantly easier for prisoners 
to file suit against prison officials.59  A prisoner only had to exhaust 
administrative remedies before filing a federal claim if a state system 
was certified by the U.S. Attorney General or a federal court.60  The 
state grievance system scheme addressed early concerns regarding a 
potential flood of inmate litigation in light of the earlier Supreme 
Court holdings permitting private federal causes of action for alleged 
constitutional violations.61   
The grievance system model was intended to provide prison 
administrators with an opportunity to address institutional complaints 
internally and avoid judicial intervention in the states’ operation of 
their prisons.62  The CRIPA acknowledged a duality in the 
administrative remedy procedure—it was both an avenue for 
 
 55. Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stat. 
349 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1997a–j (2012)). 
 56. See Lynn S. Branham, The Prison Litigation Reform Act’s Enigmatic Exhaustion 
Requirement: What It Means and What Congress, Courts and Correctional Officials 
Can Learn From It, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 483, 494–96 (2001). 
 57. CRIPA § 7(a)(2).  Certification requirements included an advisory role for employees 
and prisoners in the formulation, implementation, and operation of the system; 
maximum time limits for written replies to prisoner grievances; priority processing of 
emergency grievances; safeguards to avoid reprisals against any grievant; and 
independent review of the disposition of grievances by a person or entity not under the 
direct supervision or control of the institution.  Id. § 7(b)(2). 
 58. Id. § 7(b)(1). 
 59. Branham, supra note 56, at 495; see also Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons: 
Hearings on H.R. 10 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. 
of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 53–54 (1977) [hereinafter 
CRIPA Hearings] (statement of Rep. Drinnan) (noting a concern among state 
attorneys general “that a person should be required to exhaust his administrative 
remedies before the Attorney General can act”).  
 60. Brian J. Ostrom et al., Congress, Courts and Corrections: An Empirical Perspective 
on the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1525, 1531 (2003). 
 61. Id. at 1530–31. 
 62. See Branham, supra note 56, at 495; see also CRIPA Hearings, supra note 59, at 77 
(statement of Jay Lawrence Lichtman, Deputy Director, Defender Division, National 
Legal Aid and Defender Association).  
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prisoners to bring complaints, and an opportunity for prison 
administrators to recognize patterns of abuse, corruption, or other 
institutional shortcomings, and handle these claims internally without 
judicial involvement.63  This model preserved state agency autonomy 
while still providing a meaningful method of redress for prisoners 
alleging constitutional violations. 
One significant provision in the CRIPA required an independent 
review of the disposition of grievances “by a person or other entity 
not under the direct supervision or direct control of the institution.”64  
Congress thus recognized the importance of an objective impartial 
review of the internal adjudication of prisoner claims.  The CRIPA 
authorized the U.S. Attorney General to seek injunctive relief on 
behalf of prisoners deprived of their legal rights.65  The CRIPA also 
provided an attorney’s fee allowance:  “[A] court may allow the 
prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee against the United 
States as part of the costs.”66  This incentivized private counsel 
involvement in prisoner actions, an important provision that the 
PLRA eventually repealed.67 
The CRIPA was primarily designed to address widespread 
constitutional violations in prisons.68  While the language of the 
CRIPA regarding grievance system certification seemed strong and 
prisoner friendly, the federal government did little following the 
CRIPA’s enactment to implement the certification requirements, and 
the certified system model never caught on.69 
Notably, in the few states that obtained CRIPA certification,70 the 
grievance system model was successful in both resolving prisoner 
complaints and reducing the volume of Section 1983 actions in 
federal court.71  The administrative remedy model was put to the test, 
 
 63. CRIPA Hearings, supra note 59, at 53 (statement of Melvin T. Axilbund, Staff 
Director, A.B.A. Commission on Correctional Facilities).  
 64. CRIPA §7(b)(2)(E). 
 65. Id. § 5(a)(1). 
 66. Id. § 3(b). 
 67. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d) (2012). 
 68. See Branham, supra note 56, at 493–94. 
 69. Lewis v. Meyer, 815 F.2d 43, 44–45 (7th Cir. 1987) (observing that “the Attorney 
General has not published a list of complying state rules[,]” making state compliance 
with the certification requirement difficult if not impossible). 
 70. E.g., Iowa, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, Tennessee, and Virginia.   
 71. See, e.g., Donald P. Lay, Exhaustion of Grievance Procedures for State Prisoners 
Under Section 1997e of the Civil Rights Act, 71 IOWA L. REV. 935, 943–44 (1986).  
Between January 1 and November 30, 1984, Virginia referred 241 federal cases to the 
state’s certified grievance procedure.  Id. at 943.  Seventy of these cases were resolved 
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albeit on a limited scale, and withstood the challenge, proving that 
“[a]n early and effective grievance procedure can without question 
minimize much of the burdensome inmate litigation under Section 
1983 and still provide inmates with an expeditious and fair resolution 
of their often legitimate complaints.”72 
In 1980, there were roughly 500,000 prisoners in the United 
States.73  Throughout the 1980s, the U.S. prison population 
experienced accelerated growth due to the “War on Drugs,”74 
mandatory minimum sentencing,75 and recidivism (“three strikes”) 
statutes.76  Interestingly, the rate at which prisoners filed civil rights 
suits between 1980 and 1996 actually decreased by 17 percent,77 
instead of ballooning as one might expect (or as the PLRA’s 
proponents claimed) given the tremendous expansion of the prison 
population.78 
C. The Prison Litigation Reform Act 
In 1996, Congress passed the Prison Litigation Reform Act.79  The 
attitude toward prison litigation had taken a decisive turn from the 
socially conscious mindset of the 1970s and 1980s.  The PLRA was 
 
by the grievance procedure, and 105 cases were reconsidered by the federal courts.  
Id.  
 72. Id. at 951–52. 
 73. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, COLLATERAL COSTS: INCARCERATION’S EFFECT ON 
ECONOMIC MOBILITY 3 (2010), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfile
s/pcs_assets/2010/CollateralCosts1pdf. 
 74. “War on Drugs” refers to the federal drug prohibition policies beginning with 
President Richard Nixon’s passage of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and 
Control Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970), and further developed by the Reagan, Bush 
I, and Clinton administrations.  The phrase “War on Drugs” was first coined by 
President Reagan in a radio speech to the American public.  Reagan, in Radio Talk, 
Vows Drive Against Drugs, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 1982), http://www.nytimes.com/1982
/10/03/us/no-headline-194726.html. 
 75. E.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2000) (setting forth mandatory minimum sentencing for 
statutorily imposed limits on possession and distribution of controlled dangerous 
substances). 
 76. See Franklin E. Zimring, Penal Policy and Penal Legislation in Recent American 
Experience, 58 STAN. L. REV. 323, 331–34 (2005); see also Vincent Schiraldi, 
Digging Out: As U.S. States Begin to Reduce Prison Use, Can America Turn the 
Corner on its Imprisonment Binge?, 24 PACE L. REV. 563, 563 (2004). 
 77. See JOHN SCALIA, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONER PETITIONS IN THE FEDERAL 
COURTS, 1980–96, at iii (1997), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppfc96.pdf.  
 78. See Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1585 (2003).  
Schlanger notes that although the number of absolute filings increased during this 
period, the filing rate per prisoner “peaked in 1981.”  Id.  
 79. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2012 & Supp. I 2014). 
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introduced as part of the 1994 “Contract with America,”80 and 
packaged as a rider to an appropriations bill.81  Just like the War on 
Drugs, the PLRA capitalized on public sentiment regarding tort 
reform and other law and order goals.82  Senator Orrin Hatch, then 
Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee introduced the PLRA in 
1995: 
 This landmark legislation will help bring relief to a civil 
justice system overburdened by frivolous prisoner lawsuits.  
Jailhouse lawyers with little better to do are tying our courts 
in knots with an endless flow of frivolous litigation.  
 Our legislation will also help to restore a balance to prison 
conditions litigation and will ensure that Federal court 
orders are limited to remedying actual violations of 
prisoners’ rights, not letting prisoners out of jail.  It is time 
to lock the revolving prison door and to put the key safely 
out of reach of overzealous Federal courts.83 
The PLRA’s primary purpose was to reduce a perceived 
“epidemic” of frivolous prisoner lawsuits.84  Its enactment was 
premised on the belief that prisoners “were unduly litigious, making 
federal cases out of the most trivial mishaps[,]” and these cases “were 
deluging both executive and judicial officials who were supposed to 
respond to them,” resulting in “remarkably few successes” for 
prisoners.85  The CRIPA, critics argued, was too permissive in 
opening the doors to the courtrooms, and had a burgeoning effect on 
federal dockets.86  Proponents of the PLRA did not consider that the 
growing prisoner docket was more a result of rapidly rising prison 
populations than frivolous litigation.87  In fact, contrary to the 
 
 80.     See Contract With America, NAT’L CTR. FOR PUB. POL’Y RES. (1994), http://www.nati
onalcenter.org/ContractwithAmerica.html; H.R. 3, 104th Cong. (1995).  
 81. H.R. 2076, 104th Cong. Tit. VIII (1995). 
 82. See Roger Roots, Of Prisoners and Plaintiff’s Lawyers: A Tale of Two Litigation 
Reform Efforts, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 210, 210–11 (2002); see also Kenneth B. 
Nunn, Race, Crime and the Pool of Surplus Criminality: Or Why the “War on Drugs” 
was a “War on Blacks,” 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 381, 389–91 (2002) (arguing that 
President Reagan’s drug war efforts were purely political and exploited the prevailing 
view toward illicit drugs in America in the 1980s).   
 83. 141 CONG. REC. 27,042 (1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
 84. Kermit Roosevelt III, Exhaustion Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act: The 
Consequence of Procedural Error, 52 EMORY L.J. 1771, 1776 (2003). 
 85. Schlanger, supra note 78, at 1567. 
 86. See id. at 1566–67. 
 87. Id. at 1586–87. 
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position asserted by the PLRA’s proponents, a study conducted the 
year prior to the PLRA’s enactment concluded that prisoners “are no 
more litigious than anyone else.”88 
1. Misplaced Reasoning and the PLRA – Anecdotal Hype 
Congress failed to recognize that “[w]hat for a private citizen 
would be a dispute with his landlord, with his employer, with his 
tailor, with his neighbor, or with his banker becomes, for the 
prisoner, a dispute with the State.”89  The “frivolity” cited by the 
PLRA’s proponents was, in large part, only frivolous to them because 
they lacked an appropriate frame of reference.90  This is not to dispute 
or minimize the concern of frivolous prisoner litigation.  Rather, the 
soaring rhetoric proclaiming an “epidemic” of frivolous prisoner suits 
was based on anecdotal lobbying instead of empirical data.91 
At first blush, the impetus for the PLRA seems logical and correct.  
Surely it is in everyone’s best interest, including prisoners with 
meritorious claims, to have the federal docket freed up to the point 
that only worthy complaints are heard.  In a 1995 letter to the editor 
published in the New York Times, four attorneys general argued in 
support of the PLRA:  “Taxpayers have grown justifiably tired of 
footing the bill for the special privileges provided to prisoners . . . .”92  
In support of the PLRA, the National Association of Attorneys 
General (NAAG) compiled a “top ten frivolous litigation list”93 to 
illustrate the need for limiting prisoners’ access to the courts.94  The 
list purportedly provided an accurate snapshot of prisoner litigation, 
demonstrating the overall frivolity of these suits.  The list including 
suits about a prisoner who “claimed he was not provided rubber 
shoes when he was ordered to mop the floor[;]” a prisoner who 
“claimed corrections officers were injecting the toothpaste in the 
commissary with pork by-products[;]” a prisoner who sued “because 
the prison’s shower water was too cold and the building itself was too 
 
 88. Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA): Myths and Facts, SAVE COALITION, 
http://www.savecoalition.org/myths.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2015) (noting that in 
1995, the rate of prisoner civil rights suits was 25 per 1000, while the rate of lawsuits 
filed by the entire U.S. population in both state and federal courts was 56 per 1000). 
 89. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 492 (1973). 
 90. Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA): Myths and Facts, supra note 88. 
 91. Roosevelt, supra note 84, at 1777. 
 92. Dennis C. Vacco et al., Letter to the Editor, Free the Courts From Frivolous Prisoner 
Suits, N.Y. TIMES (March 3, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/03/03/opinion/l-
free-the-courts-from-frivolous-prisoner-suits-486495.html. 
 93. See William C. Collins, Bumps in the Road to the Courthouse: The Supreme Court 
and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 24 PACE L. REV. 651, 667 (2004). 
 94. Id. 
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drafty[;]” and the most infamous case involving a prisoner who 
“sued, claiming cruel and unusual punishment because he received 
one jar of chunky and one jar of creamy peanut butter after ordering 
two jars of chunky from the prison canteen.”95  Congress bought into 
the hype and actually cited a similar list in debates on the House 
floor,96 demonstrating the belief that the NAAG list was an accurate 
depiction of the majority of prisoner litigation.   
Prisoner rights advocates responded by publishing their own list of 
ten “non-frivolous lawsuits,”97 which described some of the most 
horrific and egregious examples of prison brutality and corruption.  
These suits included a case where “[d]ozens of women, some as 
young as 16, [were] forced to have sex with prison guards, 
maintenance workers, and a prison chaplain[;]” a case in which a 
“prisoner [gave] birth on the floor of the jail without medical 
assistance three hours after informing prison staff that she was in 
active labor[;]” and a case involving “single person cells hous[ing] 
four or five prisoners with mattresses on the floor soaked by 
overflowing toilets.”98  The debate became a “war of extremes,”99 
grounded on both sides in purely anecdotal evidence.  When the 
PLRA was introduced in the Senate, bipartisan support existed for the 
legislation.100  The PLRA passed in a process that “was characterized 
by haste and lack of any real debate.”101 
PART II 
A. The PLRA’s Requirements 
The PLRA imposed many new requirements on prisoner litigants 
and drastically changed the Section 1983 and CRIPA models of 
 
 95. Derek Borchardt, The Iron Curtain Redrawn Between Prisoners and the Constitution, 
43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 469, 480 n.65 (2012); Jon O. Newman, Pro Se 
Prisoner Litigation, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 519, 520–21 (1996). 
 96. See 141 CONG. REC. 27,045 (1995) (listing the “Top Ten Frivolous Inmate Lawsuits 
Nationally”). 
 97. The Top Ten Non-Frivolous Lawsuits Filed by Prisoners, ACLU NAT’L PRISON 
PROJECT, http://archive.acluor.org/archive/Leg_2005/pdf/Leg_2005_HB2140_top10.p
df (last visited Nov. 13, 2015). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Schlanger, supra note 78, at 1569. 
 100. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. 27042–44 (1995) (supporters of the PLRA included 
Senators Bob Dole, Orrin Hatch, and Harry Reid). 
 101. Susan N. Herman, Slashing and Burning Prisoners’ Rights: Congress and the 
Supreme Court in Dialogue, 77 OR. L. REV. 1229, 1277 (1998). 
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unabridged access to the federal courts for all.102  The PLRA became, 
in effect, a roadblock between prisoners and the courts.103  The 
PLRA’s requirements included exhaustion of administrative remedies 
as a precondition to filing suit,104 limitations on prospective relief,105 a 
three-strikes provision barring future filings if a prisoner has 
previously filed three suits that were deemed frivolous, malicious, or 
were dismissed for “fail[ure] to state a claim upon which relief could 
be granted,”106 caps on attorney’s fees,107 exclusions of recovery for 
“mental or emotional injury . . . without a prior showing of physical 
injury or the commission of a sexual act[,]”108 and mandating that 
even indigent prisoners pay filing fees.109  Extensive scholarship 
exists discussing the intricacies of the PLRA’s provisions, and, as 
such, this Comment will not address them all.  This Comment instead 
focuses on the exhaustion requirement of the PLRA, the proper 
exhaustion rule, and the procedural default consequence added by the 
Supreme Court.110 
Although many of the PLRA’s provisions discourage prisoner 
claims, none are more profound than the exhaustion requirement.  
Exhaustion was never supposed to precondition a Section 1983 
action.111  Prior to the PLRA, exhaustion was only required where a 
state’s grievance system was certified by the U.S. Attorney General 
or by a federal court.112  Even in a CRIPA certified system, 
exhaustion “was in large part discretionary.”113  Further, if the 
 
 102. See generally Schlanger, supra note 78, at 1627–33 (detailing the changes made to 
procedural law by the PLRA and the effects those changes had on inmate access to 
federal courts and remedies).  
 103. Id. at 1562 (“[T]he PLRA shut the courthouse doors to many inmates.”). 
 104. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2012). 
 105. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (2012).  Prospective relief refers to “all relief other than 
compensatory monetary damages,” specifically referring to injunctive relief that was 
common in the form of consent decrees prior to the PLRA’s enactment.  Id. § 
3626(g)(7). 
 106. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2012). 
 107. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(3). 
 108. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). 
 109. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 
 110. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 111. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.  Exhaustion is an administrative law 
construct, and applied where Congress has established an administrative agency to 
handle grievances that occur under its purview.  Prior to the PLRA, a Section 1983 
suit was an independent federal cause of action with no relation to administrative 
proceedings.   
 112. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 113. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523 (2002) (holding that under the CRIPA, exhaustion 
could only be required if the “court believed the requirement ‘appropriate and in the 
 
2015 It’s “Exhausting” 169 
 
exhaustion requirement was imposed, the CRIPA required that the 
case be continued for up to ninety days in order for the prisoner to 
properly exhaust the available administrative remedies.114  Since the 
PLRA’s enactment there have been seven Supreme Court opinions 
dealing with its provisions, four of the seven cases dealt specifically 
with the exhaustion requirement.115  Each of these cases further 
elucidated the exhaustion rule and ultimately added the procedural 
default consequence for failure to “properly” exhaust.116 
B. Exhaustion Under the PLRA 
The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement provides:  “No action shall be 
brought with respect to prison conditions under [Section 1983] or any 
other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other 
correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are 
available are exhausted.”117  Exhaustion under the PLRA became 
mandatory, changing the CRIPA standard and creating a significant 
procedural hurdle to filing suit in federal court.118  The exhaustion 
provision’s specific requirements remained unclear until a string of 
Supreme Court decisions clarified the provision, ending with the 
2007 decision in Jones v. Bock.119  The PLRA also changed the 
CRIPA’s mandate that state prison grievance systems be “plain, 
speedy, and effective” for exhaustion to even be considered as a 
 
interests of justice.’”).  CRIPA’s exhaustion provision is a “limited exhaustion 
requirement” that is “inapplicable to prisoner suits for damages when monetary relief 
was unavailable through the prison grievance system.”  Id. at 254 (citing McCarthy v. 
Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 150–51 (1992)). 
 114. Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), Pub. L. No. 96-247, § 7(a)(1), 
94 Stat. 349 (1980). 
 115. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007) (failure to exhaust administrative remedies in 
federal court is an affirmative defense); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006) (proper 
exhaustion is required, and failure to properly exhaust results in procedural default); 
Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 650 (2004) (even Section 1983 claims must be 
exhausted before filing suit); Porter, 534 U.S. at 516 (all conditions of confinement 
claims require exhaustion); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001) (there is no 
futility exception to the exhaustion requirement). 
 116. Jones, 549 U.S. at 211–12; Woodford, 548 U.S. at 85; Nelson, 541 U.S. at 643; 
Porter, 534 U.S. at 519–20; Booth, 532 U.S. at 735. 
 117. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2012). 
 118. See Branham, supra note 56, at 497–98 (outlining the procedural hurdles imposed by 
the PLRA). 
 119. 549 U.S. 199.  The text of the exhaustion provision left open questions regarding its 
scope, application, and administration procedures, and between 1996 and 2007, the 
Supreme Court dealt with each of these questions.  Jones signifies the last case 
interpreting the exhaustion requirement. 
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requirement.120  States are now free to create grievance systems that 
are complex, making compliance difficult at best. 
Conceptually, the exhaustion provision seems reasonable and well 
grounded.  Prison administrators should be given the first opportunity 
to handle a prisoner’s grievance, both for expediency and autonomy.  
Given the frequency with which prisoners file suit, and that these 
individuals are committed to the custody of the state in which they 
were sentenced, it is entirely reasonable for state prison agencies to 
have some autonomy in addressing complaints within their purview, 
and for administrative exhaustion to dissuade frivolous filings.121  
This autonomy, however, should not preclude meritorious claims 
from reaching the federal courts.  Prison grievance systems are not 
zero sum situations—there must be room for both administrative 
autonomy in prison management and a prisoner’s ability to bring a 
constitutional claim in federal court under Section 1983.  The 
Supreme Court’s decisions following the PLRA’s enactment 
illustrate the imbalance in favor of unchecked agency autonomy at 
the expense of constitutional rights. 
C. Supreme Court Interpretation of Exhaustion 
1. Booth v. Churner 
In 2001, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Booth v. Churner 
to resolve a circuit split regarding the PLRA’s exhaustion 
provision.122  The Court specifically addressed whether a prisoner 
seeking compensatory damages in a Section 1983 action is subject to 
the exhaustion requirement when the internal grievance procedure 
could not provide the prisoner with the requested relief.123  In other 
words, is there a futility exception to the exhaustion requirement?  A 
unanimous Court held that there is no such exception to the PLRA.124  
In so concluding, the Court reasoned that since the PLRA removed 
the requirement that a grievance system be “effective,” as originally 
 
 120. Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), Pub. L. No. 96-247, § 7(b)(1), 
94 Stat. 349 (1980).  
 121. Jones, 549 U.S. at 202–03. 
 122. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 735 (2001).  The Third Circuit held that a grievance 
system’s inability to provide a prisoner with the requested relief did not create an 
exception to the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289, 
299–300 (3d Cir. 2000), while the Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits held that such an 
exception was appropriate.  See, e.g., Whitely v. Hunt, 158 F.3d 882, 888 (5th Cir. 
1998); Lunsford v. Jumao-As, 155 F.3d 1178, 1179 (9th Cir. 1998); Garrett v. Hawk, 
127 F.3d 1263, 1266–67 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 123. Booth, 532 U.S. at 735. 
 124. Id. at 740–41 (citing McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992)). 
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provided in the CRIPA, “Congress has mandated exhaustion clearly 
enough, regardless of the relief offered through administrative 
procedures.”125  The Court thus removed traditional exhaustion 
exceptions found in other areas of administrative law.126 
2. Porter v. Nussle 
In 2002, the Court again addressed the PLRA’s exhaustion 
provision in Porter v. Nussle.127  This case involved a prisoner 
(Nussle) who filed suit alleging that he was attacked and beaten by 
several prison guards.128  Rather than first pursuing the administrative 
remedy procedure, Nussle filed a Section 1983 claim in federal court, 
charging a violation of his right to be free from cruel and unusual 
punishment.129  The district court dismissed Nussle’s claim for failure 
to exhaust, but the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, 
holding that “exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required 
for [prisoner] claims of assault or excessive force brought under § 
1983.”130  The Court of Appeals relied on the plain text of the PLRA 
which requires exhaustion “with respect to prison conditions,” and 
concluded that prison conditions did not include “single or 
momentary matter[s], such as beatings.”131  In another unanimous 
decision, the Supreme Court reversed:  “[T]he PLRA’s exhaustion 
requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they 
involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether 
they allege excessive force or some other wrong.”132 
 
 125. Id.  This holding not only removed the traditional futility exception to administrative 
remedies, but also disregarded the need for state grievance systems to be fair and 
effective, thus giving states the freedom to construct unreasonable procedural rules 
without consequence. 
 126. Exceptions include pure questions of law in which agency actions may be challenged 
without exhausting administrative remedies, futility, and unavailability of remedies.  
JACOB A. STEIN, ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 5-49 § 49.02 (Matthew Bender & Co., 
Inc. 2014). 
 127. 534 U.S. 516 (2002). 
 128. Id. at 520. 
 129. Id. at 521. 
 130. Id. (alteration in original).  This holding hearkened back to the sentiment of the 
Cooper court—that a prisoner filing a Section 1983 action should not have to wrangle 
procedural barriers in an attempt to have their claim heard by a judge.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 43–44. 
 131. Porter, 534 U.S. at 521–22 (alteration in original) (emphasis supplied) (citation 
omitted). 
 132. Id. at 532. 
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3. Woodford v. Ngo 
Booth and Porter confirmed exhaustion as a universal requirement 
and as a prerequisite to a federal claim, thus setting the stage for the 
next major PLRA battle—what are the consequences a prisoner faces 
for failure to exhaust?  In 2006, the Court decided Woodford v. 
Ngo,133 the case that ultimately answered this question.  Ngo, a 
California prisoner, filed a grievance beyond the fifteen-day period 
set forth in the California regulation,134 and, as a result, his grievance 
was dismissed.135  The dismissal was based purely on Ngo’s failure to 
comply with the procedural filing period and was not a decision on 
the merits of his claim.136  Ngo appealed the procedural dismissal, 
and the district court granted the State’s motion to dismiss for failure 
to exhaust.137  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit refused to read a 
procedural default requirement into the PLRA’s exhaustion provision 
and reversed, holding that Ngo had indeed exhausted his 
administrative remedies because “no such remedies remained 
available to him.”138  The appellate court found support for its holding 
in the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, which prohibits a federal 
claim “until such administrative remedies as are available are 
exhausted.”139  The Ninth Circuit also held that a denial on state 
 
 133. 548 U.S. 81, 83–84 (2006). 
 134. Id. at 86–87.  The California regulation in question only provided appeal rights to a 
claim that was not rejected on procedural grounds.  CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 
3084.5(c) (2004).  Under this regulation, a prisoner had to navigate four levels of 
administrative grievances and appeals before exhausting all administrative remedies.  
Id.  
 135. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 87. 
 136. Id.  
 137. Id.  The district court reasoned that since Ngo failed to reach the final stage in the 
administrative scheme, he had failed to exhaust all administrative remedies as 
required by the PLRA.  Ngo v. Woodford, 403 F.3d 620, 625 (9th Cir. 2005), rev’d, 
548 U.S. 81 (2006). 
 138. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 87.  Since the regulatory deadline had passed, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that no administrative remedy was available to Ngo.  On the issue of 
procedural default, the appellate court concluded:  “Procedural default is not an 
inextricable element of the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement.  If it were, prisoners’ 
access to courts would be based on their ability to navigate procedural minefields, not 
on whether their claims had any merit.”  Ngo, 403 F.3d at 631. 
 139. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2012 & Supp. I 2014) (emphasis supplied).  This holding was 
consistent with the Sixth Circuit, see Thomas v. Woolum, 337 F.3d 720 (6th Cir. 
2003), but conflicted with four other Courts of Appeals.  See Johnson v. Meadows, 
418 F.3d 1152, 1153 (11th Cir. 2005); Ross v. County of Bernalillo, 365 F.3d 1181, 
1182 (10th Cir. 2004); Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2004); Pozo v. 
McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1023–24 (7th Cir. 2002). 
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procedural grounds does not preclude subsequent judicial review of 
the underlying claim.140   
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.141  Writing for 
the majority, Justice Alito concluded:  “[T]he PLRA exhaustion 
requirement requires proper exhaustion.”142  Proper exhaustion 
demands that a non-exhausted claim can be procedurally dismissed 
without a ruling on the merits.143  In so concluding, the majority noted 
that “[e]xhaustion is an important doctrine in both administrative and 
habeas law,” and thus borrowed from both bodies of law in its 
interpretation.144  Administrative law predicates “judicial relief” on 
the exhaustion of the “prescribed administrative remedy[.]”145  
Administrative law demands proper exhaustion; that is, “using all 
steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the 
agency addresses the issue on the merits).”146  Habeas law also 
requires a prisoner to exhaust state remedies before filing a petition in 
federal court.147  A prisoner satisfies habeas exhaustion, however, 
once state remedies “are no longer available, regardless of the reason 
for their unavailability.”148   
The Court also interpreted the “general scheme” of the PLRA, as 
attempting to both reduce the quantity and improve the quality of 
prisoner suits, and to remove federal court oversight and interference 
with prison administration.149  The Court held that a proper 
exhaustion requirement “serves all of these goals.”150  “The benefits 
of exhaustion can be realized only if the prison grievance system is 
given a fair opportunity to consider the grievance.”151  The Court 
ignored the other side of this coin—a fair opportunity for the 
grievance to be heard.  Further, the Court extended the proper 
 
 140. Ngo, 403 F.3d at 631. 
 141. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 82, 87.  The decision was 5–1–3, with Chief Justice Roberts 
and Justices Alito, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, in the majority, Justice Breyer 
concurring, and Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg dissenting. 
 142. Id. at 93. 
 143. Id. at 81. 
 144. Id. at 88. 
 145. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969) (quoting Myers v. Bethlehem 
Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50–51 (1938)). 
 146. Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002).  Interestingly, the Court 
implies that proper exhaustion means that the agency addresses the issue on the 
merits, and not by summarily dismissing claims on solely procedural grounds.  Id. 
 147. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 92. 
 148. Id. at 92–93. 
 149. Id. at 93–94. 
 150. Id. at 94. 
 151. Id. at 95 (emphasis supplied). 
174 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW Vol. 45 
exhaustion rule beyond time deadlines to all state procedural rules, 
and defined the requirement as follows:  “[A] prisoner must complete 
the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable 
procedural rules, including deadlines, as a precondition to bringing 
suit in federal court.”152  This additional requirement significantly 
enhanced the exhaustion provision of the PLRA, mandating that a 
court dismiss a claim, not only if it was untimely under state 
regulations, but also if it failed to comply with even the most minute 
procedural directive.153  Woodford is the most significant decision 
since the PLRA’s enactment because of the addition of proper 
exhaustion and the consequence of procedural default.154 
Woodford was not the right case to determine the consequence for 
failure to exhaust.  The plaintiff failed to comply with the regulatory 
guidelines not because of some exigency, but because of neglect.155  
It was this neglect upon which the majority premised its strongest 
reasoning, holding that if they accepted Ngo’s argument, “a prisoner 
wishing to bypass available administrative remedies could simply file 
a late grievance without providing any reason for failing to file on 
time[,]” thus thwarting the administrative process entirely.156  This 
rationale makes good sense.  A more appropriate case to challenge 
the exhaustion requirement would have been a defaulted claim due to 
an inability to file within the regulatory time period,157 or a defaulted 
claim as a result of an overly complex and difficult to follow 
grievance model.  Nevertheless, Woodford is the case that ultimately 
decided the full scope of PLRA exhaustion and the consequences for 
failure to exhaust. 
4. Jones v. Bock 
In 2007, the Supreme Court decided Jones v. Bock,158 the last 
opinion dealing with the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement.  This case 
dealt with challenges to the Sixth Circuit’s adoption of heightened 
pleading standards, which were “designed to implement the 
exhaustion requirement and facilitate early judicial screening.”159  
The Sixth Circuit interpreted the PLRA’s exhaustion provision as 
 
 152. Id. at 88. 
 153. See infra Part III.B. 
 154. See infra Part III.A. 
 155. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 86–87. 
 156. Id. at 95. 
 157. E.g., Minix v. Pazera, No. 3:06-CV-398RM, 2007 WL 4233455 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 28, 
2007). 
 158. 549 U.S. 199 (2007). 
 159. Id. at 202–03. 
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requiring a prisoner to plead exhaustion as an element of the 
complaint, to name all defendants who might later be sued, and to 
exhaust each claim in the complaint separately.160  On certiorari, the 
Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case.161  In a unanimous 
decision, Chief Justice Roberts explained that “failure to exhaust is 
an affirmative defense under the PLRA[;]”162 “exhaustion is not per 
se inadequate simply because an individual later sued was not named 
in the grievances[;]”163 and that requiring a prisoner to exhaust each 
claim asserted in a complaint “certainly [does] not comport with the 
purpose of the PLRA to reduce the quantity of inmate suits.”164  
Although the Court struck down these heightened pleading 
requirements, its rationale was not based on the standards being too 
complex or prejudicial to prisoner litigants, as the standards would 
have been judicially enforced had they been set forth as part of the 
prison grievance procedure.165  The Jones Court thus reaffirmed a 
policy of deferral to prison administrators in rulemaking, regardless 
of how difficult or prejudicial those rules may be.166 
PART III 
A. The Stevens Dissent in Woodford 
Justice Stevens wrote a trenchant dissent in Woodford, arguing that 
the majority’s interpretation of the exhaustion requirement was 
wrong because it ignored the plain text of the PLRA,167 it was based 
on flawed reasoning,168 and it misconstrued precedent regarding 
administrative exhaustion.169  Stevens further emphasized that the 
purposes of the PLRA—to reduce frivolity and improve the quality of 
 
 160. Jones v. Bock, 135 F. App’x. 837, 839 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 161. Jones, 549 U.S. at 199. 
 162. Id. at 216. 
 163. Id. at 219. 
 164. Id. at 223. 
 165. Id. at 218–19. 
 166. See id. at 218. 
 167. Woodford, 548 U.S. 81, 105–07 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he text of the 
PLRA does not impose a sanction of waiver or procedural default upon those 
prisoners who make such procedural errors.”).  
 168. Id. at 107–15 (asserting that the majority’s application of “extratextual waiver 
sanctions” to a de novo proceeding under Section 1983 was “seriously misguided”). 
 169. Id. at 111–13 (noting the majority’s “misapprehension” of precedent by “engrafting a 
procedural default rule into the PLRA”). 
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prisoner suits—would be served “even if the Court did not engraft a 
procedural default sanction into the statute.”170 
The majority, argued Stevens, incorrectly applied principles of 
administrative law to the PLRA.  Administrative exhaustion is an 
appellate concept prohibiting a reviewing court from “consider[ing] 
arguments not properly raised before the agency.”171  Section 1983 
actions are unlike administrative agency appeals in that they are not 
filed “to obtain direct review” of the grievance procedure, rather they 
seek to “obtain redress for an alleged violation of federal law 
committed by state corrections officials.”172  “[P]risoners who bring 
[Section 1983] actions . . . are entitled to de novo proceedings in the 
federal district court without any deference (on issues of law or fact) 
to any ruling in the administrative grievance proceedings.”173  
Administrative law principles are therefore inapplicable to prisoner 
civil rights actions.174   
Habeas law, Stevens contended, was also incorrectly applied to the 
PLRA, citing “no fewer than six cases” in which the Supreme Court 
“stated explicitly” that a habeas petitioner has satisfied the exhaustion 
requirement “so long as state-court remedies are no longer available 
to him at the time of the federal-court filing, regardless of the reason 
for their unavailability.”175 Thus, there is no procedural default 
consequence in the habeas statute.176 
One of Stevens’ strongest arguments lies in his critique of the 
majority’s reasoning that procedural default achieves the goals of the 
PLRA.177  Stevens noted that in addition to reducing frivolous claims, 
the PLRA, as explained by various Senators during floor debates, was 
also designed to “preserv[e] prisoners’ capacity to file meritorious 
claims[.]”178  The addition of proper exhaustion and procedural 
default, Stevens argued, “bars litigation at random, irrespective of 
whether a claim is meritorious or frivolous.”179  Reducing the 
quantity and filing rates of prisoner litigation had already been 
achieved prior to Pozo v. McCaughtry,180 the first appellate decision 
 
 170. Id. at 114–15. 
 171. Id. at 111. 
 172. Id. at 113. 
 173. Id. 
 174. See id. 
 175. Id. at 109. 
 176. See id. at 108 (“[T]he exhaustion requirement in the federal habeas statute does not 
incorporate a procedural default sanction.”). 
 177. Id. at 114–20. 
 178. Id. at 117. 
 179. Id. at 117–18. 
 180. 286 F.3d 1022 (7th Cir. 2002). 
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interpreting a procedural exhaustion requirement into the PLRA.181  
Stevens surmised that the reduction in claims resulted from the 
ordinary exhaustion requirement in the plain text of the statute,182 
thus undermining the majority’s contention that, without proper 
exhaustion, the provision would be turned “into a largely useless 
appendage.”183  This reduction can also be attributed to other 
provisions in the PLRA, like the requirement that even indigent 
prisoners filing in forma pauperis pay all filing fees.184   
Finally, Stevens pointed out that “[o]rdinary exhaustion also 
improves the quality of prisoner suits[,]” because it gives prison 
administrators the opportunity to address a grievance on the merits 
and creates an administrative record that is helpful once a suit is 
filed.185  Justice Stevens noted that rather than imposing a procedural 
default “punishment . . . federal courts could simply exercise their 
discretion to dismiss [frivolous or non-exhausted] suits[.]”186 
B. Administrative Grievance Procedures – The Inherent Conflict 
Under the current model, a prisoner must submit his or her initial 
grievance to the same officials who create the procedural scheme, 
and who are often named defendants in the underlying action.187  This 
reality creates an inherent conflict of interest in the current 
administrative remedy system.  A complaining prisoner is usually 
grieving about treatment by prison officials, using the rules 
promulgated and enforced by those same personnel.188  Although the 
Supreme Court believes that prison administrators “have a reason for 
creating and retaining grievance systems that provide—and that are 
perceived by prisoners as providing—a meaningful opportunity for 
prisoners to raise meritorious grievances[,]”189 the Court fails to 
consider that those same officials have a self-serving interest in 
 
 181. Woodford, 538 U.S. at 116 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  The dissent pointed to statistics 
in the Petitioner’s Brief noting that both the number and rate of filings decreased by 
nearly 50% between 1995 and 2000.  Id. at 115–16 (citing Brief for Petitioners at 21–
22, Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006) (No. 05–416), 2005 WL 3598180). 
 182. Id. at 116. 
 183. Id. at 93 (majority opinion). 
 184. Id. at 94 n.4. 
 185. Id. at 116 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Ordinary exhaustion also provides prison officials 
with an incentive to resolve the grievance internally, rather than opening the door for 
judicial intervention.  See Thomas v. Woolum, 337 F.3d 720, 732 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 186. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 119 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 187. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 188. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 119 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 189. Id. at 102 (majority opinion). 
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preventing the most meritorious claims from ever seeing the light of 
day.  In fact, the Court dismisses such a contention as speculative.190  
In so doing, the Court seemingly reverts to the “hands off” 
rationale,191 giving prison administrators the power to procedurally 
bar a grievance from reaching a federal court, thus abridging federal 
jurisdiction.  
This conflict is embodied in many cases, too numerous to list in 
full.  In Sanders v. Bachus,192 for example, a prisoner’s assault claim 
was dismissed for non-exhaustion when the prisoner did not first 
present the grievance to the officer who allegedly assaulted him.193  In 
Snyder v. Whittier,194 a prisoner’s assault and excessive force claim 
was dismissed for failure to exhaust, even though the prisoner 
“testified that he was fearful of filing a grievance” with the assaulting 
officer out of concern for retaliation by that guard.195  
Interestingly, the Supreme Court recognized the inherent conflict of 
interests in other prisoner contexts, yet seemingly ignored this 
recognition when interpreting the PLRA.  Disciplinary hearing 
officers, observed the Court, “are under obvious pressure to resolve a 
disciplinary dispute in favor of the institution and their fellow 
employee.”196  This “relationship between the keeper and the kept” is 
hardly “conducive to a truly adjudicatory performance.”197  
“[D]isciplinary boards, composed of correctional officials, may be 
overly inclined to accept the word of prison guards” over a 
prisoner.198  The same officials who comprise disciplinary review 
boards are the ones responsible for handling prisoner grievances.199  
The syllogism is clear:  if a disciplinary official is “under obvious 
pressure” to find in favor of the institution, surely an official who is 
the subject of a complaint has a similar incentive to dismiss that 
claim without reaching its merits.  Allowing these officials to dispose 
of a constitutional claim for procedural reasons undermines a 
prisoner’s constitutional right to have the claim adjudicated on the 
merits.  This conflict of interests promotes a competing purpose—
 
 190. Id. 
 191. See supra notes 29–33 and accompanying text. 
 192. No. 1:07-cv-360, 2008 WL 5422857 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 10, 2008). 
 193. Id. at *5. 
 194. 428 F. App’x. 89 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 195. Id. at 91. 
 196. Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 204 (1985).   
 197. Id. 
 198. Ponte v. Real 471 U.S. 491, 513 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting the 
“integral” right of a prisoner to call witnesses at a disciplinary hearing). 
 199. See id. 
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rather than encouraging accountability, such a system incentivizes 
prison officials “to immunize themselves from future liability.”200 
Also problematic is the absence of any exceptions to the proper 
exhaustion requirement.201  The PLRA requires a prisoner to exhaust 
“such administrative remedies as are available.”202  “Availab[ility]” 
is presumed, unless a system “lacks authority to provide any relief or 
take any action whatsoever in response to a complaint.”203  Equally 
troubling is that many courts have dismissed claims for non-
exhaustion even where good cause existed for the noncompliance.  
These cases include a prisoner who was hospitalized outside the 
institution until after the filing period passed,204 brain injury,205 
illiteracy,206 a prisoner in solitary confinement without access to the 
necessary forms,207 and a prisoner’s inability to read English.208  
Further, courts have refused to recognize an emergency exception to 
the exhaustion requirement.209  The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement 
was never meant to be so absolute. 
C. The Consequences of Proper Exhaustion and Procedural Default 
Supporters of the PLRA emphasized that the legislation was not 
designed “to prevent inmates from raising legitimate claims,”210 and 
that the “reasonable requirements [of the PLRA] will not impede 
meritorious claims by inmates.”211  These assertions, however, do not 
 
 200. Margo Schlanger & Giovanna Shay, Preserving the Rule of Law in America’s 
Prisons: The Case for Amending the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 11 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 139, 151 (2007). 
 201. See supra notes 122–26 and accompanying text.  The exception doctrine is further 
examined in Part IV. 
 202. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2012 & Supp. I 2014) (emphasis supplied). 
 203. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 736 (2001) (emphasis supplied). 
 204. Steele v. N.Y State Dept. of Corr. Servs., No. 99 Civ 6111(LAK), 2000 WL 777931, 
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2000). 
 205. Williams v. Kennedy, No. C.A. C-05-411, 2006 WL 18314, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 4, 
2006). 
 206. Ramos v. Smith, 187 F. App’x. 152, 154 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 207. Green v. McBride, No. 5:04-cv-01181, 2007 WL 2815444, at *3 (S.D. W.Va. Sept. 
25, 2007). 
 208. Benavidez v. Stansberry, No. 4:07CV03334, 2008 WL 42779559, at *2 (N.D. Ohio 
Sept. 12, 2008). 
 209. See, e.g., Sanders v. Norris, No. 5:08CV00049 JTR, 2008 WL 2926198, at *2 n.8 
(E.D. Ark. July 24, 2008) (“Recognizing an exception for ‘urgent medical needs’ 
would defeat the purpose of the exhaustion requirement . . . .”). 
 210. 141 CONG. REC. S14,627 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
 211. 141 CONG. REC. H1480 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1995) (statement of Rep. Canady). 
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correspond with the realities following the PLRA’s enactment.  
Proper exhaustion is the biggest reason why. 
Proper exhaustion has most succeeded in barring claims by 
inexperienced prisoner litigants.  “Frequent filers”212—those who file 
mostly frivolous lawsuits with impunity—are seasoned professionals 
in navigating prison grievance system requirements, and are not 
deterred by proper exhaustion.  They know precisely what is required 
to properly exhaust administrative remedies simply because they 
have done so with great regularity.  Proper exhaustion impacts the 
first-time filer who, until suffering some constitutional deprivation, 
has never encountered the prison grievance system.213  It is precisely 
this prisoner who most needs judicial access.  Yet proper exhaustion 
and the lack of meaningful independent oversight prevents this from 
occurring. 
Since Woodford, thousands of cases have been dismissed for failure 
to properly exhaust.  Some notable examples include a prisoner 
(Asberry) who was attacked by fellow inmates after guards allowed 
the attackers into Asberry’s cell, was left unconscious and without 
medical attention for 12 hours, remained in a coma for many days 
following the attack and hospitalized for several months thereafter, 
and suffered permanent injuries including paralysis.214  Asberry filed 
a grievance against the officers involved, but the complaint was 
dismissed for failure to properly exhaust because Asberry appealed 
the initial agency dismissal too soon.215  In Simpson v. Jones,216 a 
prisoner filed a grievance alleging retaliatory treatment by prison 
officials for filing earlier complaints.217  The grievance was dismissed 
for failure to properly exhaust because the prisoner “used red ink.”218  
In Whitener v. Buss,219 a prisoner filed a grievance alleging Eighth 
Amendment violations after being placed in a cell with a defective 
ceiling that collapsed on him causing significant injuries.220  The 
court dismissed the claim for failure to properly exhaust because the 
initial grievance was filed after the 48 hour filing deadline, even 
 
 212. This term is used to describe prisoners who “file not only a very large number of 
cases, but an especially high proportion of meritless cases.”  Schlanger, supra note 78, 
at 1648. 
 213. Id. at 1653–54. 
 214. Asberry v. Okla. Dep’t. of Corr., No. CIV-08-214-JHP, 2009 WL 152536, at *1 (E.D. 
Okla. Jan. 21, 2009). 
 215. Id. at *3. 
 216. 316 F. App’x. 807 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 217. Id. at 808. 
 218. Id. at 810. 
 219. 268 F. App’x. 477 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 220. Id. at 478. 
2015 It’s “Exhausting” 181 
 
though the prisoner was required to include the officers’ names in the 
complaint, and could not obtain them for two weeks after the 
incident.221  These cases represent a minute sampling of Woodford’s 
detrimental effects on prisoner litigation. 
Proper exhaustion and the consequence of procedural default is 
especially troubling because, as Justice Stevens pointed out, it bars 
claims at random regardless of the merits.222  Congress surely did not 
intend on authorizing arbitrary and haphazard dismissals when it 
enacted the PLRA.223  PLRA proponents confidently proclaimed:  
“This legislation will not prevent [legitimate] claims from being 
raised,”224 and noted that a reduction in frivolous suits “will free up 
judicial resources for claims with merit.”225  Proper exhaustion, 
however, has nothing to do with the resolution of a meritorious claim:  
“It requires dismissal of the case—regardless of its merit—if the 
prisoner has failed to comply with the procedural requirements.”226 
The judicial gloss of proper exhaustion has undermined the stated 
Congressional intent.  The chairman of the National Prison Rape 
Elimination Commission recognized that exhaustion under the PLRA 
“frustrate[s] Congress’s goal of eliminating sexual abuse in US 
prisons, jails, and detention centers.”227  The PLRA was designed not 
only to reduce the frivolity of prisoner suits, but also to improve the 
quality of these claims.228  It was not designed to indiscriminately 
dismiss meritorious claims solely on procedural grounds. 
The reason that proper exhaustion poses such a formidable 
challenge is two-fold.  First, and contrary to the Woodford majority’s 
belief that compliance with administrative requirements is easy,229 
administrative procedures impose very short deadlines for filing an 
 
 221. Id. at 478–79. 
 222. See supra Part III.A. 
 223. Senator Hatch was clear:  “I do not want to prevent inmates from raising legitimate 
claims.”  141 CONG. REC. at 27,042 (1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
 224. 141 CONG. REC. S14,627 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch).  
 225. 141 CONG. REC. S19,114 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
 226. FATHI, supra note 44, at 17. 
 227. Letter from Reggie B. Walton, Chairman, Nat’l Prison Rape Elimination Comm’n, to 
Representatives Bobby Scott and Randy Forbes (Jan. 24, 2008), http://www.savecoalit
ion.org/pdfs/PREA_letter_urging_reform_PLRA.pdf. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 80, 103 (2006) (noting the “informality and relative 
simplicity of prison grievance systems”). 
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initial grievance.230  Most states require that the grievance be filed 
“within 14 to 30 days of the action being challenged.”231  This 
effectively shortens what would otherwise be at least a one-year 
statute of limitations to a matter of days.232  Procedural default 
ensures that failure to file within this abbreviated limitations period 
forever bars the claim,233 because by the time a federal court reviews 
administrative compliance, the filing deadlines will have long since 
passed.234  In addition to the timing aspects, filing a grievance on the 
incorrect form,235 failing to correctly label a grievance,236 and sending 
the right form to the wrong official,237 also result in procedural 
dismissal.  If a prisoner makes even the slightest mistake in 
procedural compliance, a judge cannot consider the merits of the 
underlying claim.  This problem is exacerbated because courts will 
generally defer to the agency’s determination of whether exhaustion 
was, in fact, proper. 
Second, and more troubling, grievance systems are designed by the 
same officials who, often times, are defendants in the ultimate 
action.238  Prisoners must submit their claim to the very officials who 
have a marked interest in dismissing the grievance on procedural 
grounds, thereby diminishing the chance for judicial review.239  Such 
 
 230. Brief for the Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization for the Yale Law School 
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 6, Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 
(2006) (No. 05–416), 2006 WL 304573. 
 231. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 29, Woodford 
v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006) (No. 05–416), 2005 WL 3597818.  
 232. FATHI, supra note 44, at 13; see also Woodford, 548 U.S. at 118 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (“[I]n nine states [filing deadlines] are between 2 and 5 days.”). 
 233. E.g., Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90 (majority opinion) (holding Ngo’s failure to meet the 
15-day regulatory deadline as a bar to filing his claim). 
 234. See, e.g., Regan v. Frank, Civ. No. 06-00066 JMS-LEK, 2007 WL 10637, at *5 (D. 
Haw. Jan. 9, 2007) (“Even though [the lower court] dismissed Plaintiff’s claims 
without prejudice to the filing of a new action following proper exhaustion, Ngo 
makes proper exhaustion of these claims impossible.”).  Under the CRIPA, such a 
failure would have resulted in a stay for up to 180 days to allow the prisoner time to 
exhaust “plain, speedy, and effecting administrative remedies[.]”  See supra note 58 
and accompanying text. 
 235. Roscoe v. Dobson, 248 F. App’x. 440, 441 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 236. Richardson v. Spurlock, 260 F.3d 495, 499 (5th Cir. 2001) (dismissing for non-
exhaustion a claim labeled “administrative appeal” instead of “disciplinary appeal”). 
 237. Keys v. Craig, 160 F. App’x. 125, 126 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 238. See FATHI, supra note 44, at 12. 
 239. Since procedural dismissal essentially eliminates the possibility of judicial review 
regardless of the claim’s merits, prison officials can basically absolve themselves 
from the possibility of an adverse judgment.  A defendant must fail to raise non-
exhaustion as an affirmative defense in order to have a federal court review a 
procedurally defaulted claim.  See supra notes 158–65 and accompanying text. 
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a dismissal precludes a prisoner from filing an action in federal court, 
so prison officials have a perverse incentive to procedurally default 
the most serious claims.  Exhaustion thus encourages prison 
administrators to implement “high procedural hurdles” and never 
reach the merits of a grievance “to best preserve a defense of non-
exhaustion.”240  Although the Supreme Court scoffed at such a 
possibility,241 there is significant evidence that states have created 
procedural requirements “that cannot be understood as anything but 
attempts at blocking lawsuits.”242 
Proper exhaustion, however, is not fatally flawed in the context of 
prisoner litigation.  A middle ground exists between the need for 
reducing frivolity and increasing quality and providing prisoners with 
meritorious complaints a fair, meaningful, and effective avenue for 
redress.  Proper exhaustion can, in fact, coexist with affording 
meaningful avenues of redress. 
Regarding the first challenge, little can be accomplished in a 
uniform way.  American prisons, after all, are not governed by a 
single governing entity or agency, but rather are products of their 
distinct jurisdictions, each with varying procedures.243  Fundamental 
principles of state’s rights and agency autonomy create formidable 
obstacles in the way of federal regulations.  Coupled with the 
Supreme Court’s unwavering deference to state administrative 
rulemaking authority, absent Congressional intervention and 
amendment of the PLRA, standardizing individual agency procedural 
guidelines is likely unachievable. 
The second challenge, however, lends itself to universal reform.  
Since fundamental due process rights are implicated by dispositive 
decisions (i.e. dismissal), standards can be promulgated to allay the 
inherent conflict of interests.  The deference concerns arising from 
agency autonomy in creating their own rules are overshadowed by 
the abridgment of constitutional due process rights. 
 
 240. Schlanger & Shay, supra note 200, at 150. 
 241. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 95 (2006) (“We are confident that the PLRA did 
not create such a toothless scheme.”). 
 242. Derek Borchardt, The Iron Curtain Redrawn Between Prisoners and the Constitution, 
43 COLUM. HUM. RTS L. REV. 469, 473 (2012). 
 243. FAY STENDER & RONALD M. SINOWAY, Prisoners’ Rights Litigation, 22 AM. JUR. 
TRIALS 1, § 8 Westlaw (database updated Aug. 2015). 
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PART IV 
A. Exceptions to Proper Exhaustion – A Workable Solution 
Justice Breyer wrote a concurring opinion in Woodford, in which 
he agreed with the majority that “Congress intended the term 
‘exhausted’ to mean what the term means in administrative law, 
where exhaustion means proper exhaustion,”244 but that proper 
exhaustion under the PLRA is “not absolute.”245  Justice Breyer’s 
concurrence should be given greater consideration in the 
implementation of the exhaustion doctrine because Breyer is “a major 
voice in modern administrative law,”246 having authored an important 
treatise on the subject.247  Focusing on the administrative law source 
of “exhaustion,” Breyer noted “well-established exceptions” to this 
doctrine.248  Pointing to two circuits that adopted this interpretation of 
the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, Breyer posited that courts 
hearing prisoner cases should “consider any challenges” a prisoner 
may have regarding a “traditional [administrative] exception that the 
statute implicitly incorporates.”249 
Breyer’s concurrence is a roadmap for the coexistence of proper 
exhaustion and meaningful redress for prisoners.  This approach 
appropriately balances the need for agency autonomy in identifying 
and resolving internal problems with a prisoner’s ability to seek an 
effective remedy (for a constitutional violation).250  Although 
Breyer’s opinion seemingly contradicts the earlier holding in Booth 
regarding administrative exceptions,251 courts have recognized similar 
exceptions to the PLRA itself beyond the realm of administrative law 
principles.252   
 
 244. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 103 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citations omitted).  Justice Breyer 
noted:  “Congress [could not have] desired a system in which prisoners could elect to 
bypass prison grievance systems without consequences.”  Id. 
 245. Id. at 104. 
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 249. Id. at 104. 
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 252. See, e.g., Abney v. McGinnis, 380 F.3d 663, 667 (2d Cir. 2004) (asserting that prison 
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1. The Hemphill Framework – A Suitable Alternative 
In Hemphill v. New York,253 the Second Circuit established a three-
part test to determine whether a prisoner, in responding to the 
affirmative defense of non-exhaustion, is excused from properly 
exhausting administrative remedies:  (1) were administrative 
remedies “in fact ‘available’ to the prisoner[?;]” (2) did the 
defendants forfeit “the affirmative defense of non-exhaustion by 
failing to raise it . . . or whether the defendants’ own actions 
inhibiting the inmate’s exhaustion of remedies” estop them from 
raising non-exhaustion; and (3) “whether ‘special circumstances’ 
have been plausibly alleged that justify ‘the prisoner’s’” 
noncompliance.254  Whether remedies were “available” is an 
objective test:  “[W]ould ‘a similarly situated individual of ordinary 
firmness’ have deemed them available.”255   
The Hemphill test is akin to Justice Breyer’s theory that proper 
exhaustion “is not absolute,”256 and creates a fact-driven analysis 
considering factors beyond the prisoner’s control which may result in 
the “unavailability” of administrative remedies.  Other circuits have 
applied Hemphill since Woodford’s proper exhaustion rule, 
recognizing “special circumstances” that excuse reasonable mistakes 
and still allow a claim to proceed.257  This approach virtually removes 
any incentive for prison officials to construct difficult procedural 
barriers, or to dismiss a claim solely on procedural grounds, because 
 
2001) (noting that PLRA exhaustion “may be subject to certain defenses such as 
waiver, estoppel or equitable tolling”).  See also Moore v. Bennett, 517 F.3d 717, 725 
(4th Cir. 2008); Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006). 
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186 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW Vol. 45 
the claim can still be considered by a federal court.  The Hemphill 
test is one way to reconcile the competing interests of proper 
exhaustion and protecting constitutional rights without requiring an 
amendment or repeal of the PLRA. 
Judges should exercise discretion when considering the affirmative 
defense of non-exhaustion, and should grant a stay pending proper 
exhaustion as was once permitted under the CRIPA.258  Although the 
PLRA changed the CRIPA exhaustion standards,259 it does not 
prohibit such equitable relief.260  This judicial discretion should work 
in tandem with the other “well established” exceptions to 
administrative exhaustion. 
B. Oversight, Accountability, and Transparency – A Long Term 
Approach 
Even in the absence of the PLRA, or if certain problematic 
provisions therein were repealed or amended, judicial intervention is 
not the most effective method of prison oversight.261  Court 
involvement generally means that a depravation has already 
occurred.262  The Constitution as the basis for judicial intervention 
sets a very low bar.263  A constitutional baseline is not necessarily 
adequate when ensuring human rights.  Ongoing independent 
 
 258. See supra Part I.B. 
 259. See supra notes 117–23 and accompanying text. 
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penological concerns); Rich v. Bruce, 129 F.3d 336, 340 & n.2 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(“should have known” is not enough to prove deliberate indifference, the standard is 
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oversight, however, can prevent conditions from reaching the 
necessity of judicial intervention.264  Federal courts should remain the 
ultimate enforcers of prisoner civil rights, but a better model exists 
for preemptively thwarting such violations. 
At a time when such heightened concern is placed on the humane 
treatment of foreign detainees,265 the same scrutiny should be applied 
to American citizens incarcerated in American prisons.266  A crucial 
component of meaningful oversight is ongoing supervision.  
“Mission accomplished” is not an appropriate declaration in the 
context of prison reform.  It is too naïve to believe that, even where a 
court order has been imposed, prison officials will implement the 
ordered changes over the long term.267  The out of sight sphere in 
which prisons exist necessitate independent oversight to effect 
meaningful change over time.  We do not allow public hospitals to 
self-monitor, so why should prisons be different?  Since prison 
officials only answer to their governing agencies, and those agencies 
are rarely subjected to judicial oversight as a result of the PLRA, 
independent oversight is essential.  This need is enhanced by the 
PLRA’s limitation on injunctive relief, requiring a court to terminate 
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prison system’s failure to comply with court-ordered injunctive relief and failure to 
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an order unless there is a finding of “current or ongoing” 
constitutional violations.268 
Another way to balance agency autonomy with ensuring 
constitutional rights is through periodic and random monitoring by an 
independent body.  The United States has more prisoners than all of 
Europe,269 yet no independent entity exists to oversee and monitor 
prison conditions.270  Europe, by contrast, has a robust monitoring 
system that functions independent of state governments and ensures 
prisoner rights.271   
In Great Britain, for example, the Ministry of Justice oversees an 
independent administrative body known as Her Majesty’s 
Inspectorate of Prisons (HMIP).272  HMIP’s mandate is to “provide 
independent scrutiny of the conditions for and treatment of 
prisoners,” working to promote “the concept of ‘healthy 
establishments’ in which staff work effectively to support prisoners” 
in all places of detention in Great Britain.273  Inspectors conduct 
routine and unannounced inspections, issue reports on the conditions 
of the facilities, and make recommendations.274  HMIP promulgated 
detailed criteria for conducting these inspections known as 
“expectations.”275  The Expectations are “based on international 
human rights standards” and “issues considered essential to the safe, 
respectful, and purposeful treatment” of prisoners.276  The 
Expectations also consider the “rules, regulations and guidelines” 
governing each facility.277  The reports are published and prison 
 
 268. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(1) (2012). 
 269.   World Prison Populations, BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/uk/06/prisons/h
tml/nn1page1.stm (last visited Nov. 13, 2015). 
 270. See Mike Tartaglia, Private Prisons, Private Records, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1689, 1692–93 
(2014).  
 271. See generally Silvia Casale, Mechanisms for Custodial Oversight: The United States 
and Europe, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 217 (2006) (discussing European oversight 
mechanisms, their development and evolution, and what the Unites States can learn 
from these procedures). 
 272.   About HMI Prisons, HM INSPECTORATE OF PRISONS, http://www.justiceinspectorates.g
ov.uk/hmiprisons/about-hmi-prisons/#.VOIJZ53F98F (last visited Nov. 13, 2015). 
 273. Id.  
 274. John J. Gibbons & Nicole de B. Katzenbach, Confronting Confinement, A Report of 
the Commission on Safety and Abuse in America’s Prisons 80 (June 2006), 
http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/Confronting_Confinemen
t.pdf. 
 275. Expectations: Inspection Criteria, HM INSPECTORATE OF PRISONS, 
http://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmiprisons/about-our-inspections/inspection-
criteria/#.VOIORp3F98E (last visited Nov. 13, 2015). 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. 
2015 It’s “Exhausting” 189 
 
administrators are required to respond.278  A former warden 
commented on the effectiveness of this oversight:  “The process of 
change and improvement . . . was greatly assisted by these . . . 
independent reports because they were able draw public attention to 
all the pressures which made it difficult to manage the prison 
properly.”279  He concluded that “it took external inspections to get 
[these issues] on the public agenda.”280 
Other European countries implement monitoring standards largely 
based on multilateral treaties, such as the Inter-American Convention 
of Human Rights,281 the European Convention on Human Rights,282 
and the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and 
Inhumane or Degrading Treatment of Punishment.283  Forty-seven 
European countries also implement the European Prison Rules,284 a 
uniform set of standards focused on preventive and systemic 
concerns in prison facilities.  Additional oversight is conducted in 
countries that have ratified the Optional Protocol to the Convention 
Against Torture (OPCAT), by the United Nations Subcommittee on 
Prevention of Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment.285 
The United States stands in stark contrast to the rest of the world in 
its lack of prison oversight.286  The U.S. has not ratified OPCAT or 
submitted itself to an entity for monitoring, nor does any federal or 
state agency exist for this purpose.287  Prison administrators are self-
selected, and, because of the PLRA, are insufficiently accountable for 
violations in their institutions.  A former Oklahoma prison warden 
poignantly noted:  “When we’re not held accountable, the culture 
inside prisons becomes a place that is so foreign to the culture of the 
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real world that we develop our own way of doing things.”288  Glen 
Fine, inspector general of the U.S. Department of Justice stated:  
“There is tremendous pressure within an institution to keep quiet.”289  
A former deputy assistant attorney general at the Department of 
Justice remarked:  “Broader issues regarding the safety of the prison, 
the training of officers, and the adequacy of administrative processes 
and overall conditions in the prison [often] go unaddressed.”290 
In 2008, the American Bar Association revived Justice Brennan’s 
concerns regarding the lack of oversight in the “shadow world” of 
prisons,291 and passed a resolution “calling on [all levels of 
government] to develop comprehensive plans to make the operations 
of their correctional and detention facilities more transparent and 
accountable to the public.”292  The resolution identified four primary 
reasons for this proposal:  (1) public awareness of “significant 
problems” in prison will lead to safer and more constitutionally 
conforming institutions “equipped to better prepare inmates for a 
successful reentry into society[;]” (2) objective and independent 
oversight will detect “potential problems that have been overlooked 
at the facility[;]” (3) oversight can “be a cost-effective and proactive 
means” to avoid lawsuits; and (4) “the factual findings of the 
monitoring entity can substantiate the need” for additional funding 
and resources.293  This resolution reinforces the role of federal courts 
as venues of last resort, not the first line of defense for prisoners.  
Ongoing and independent non-judicial oversight “could make outside 
scrutiny of prisons and jails a comprehensive and ongoing process, in 
contrast to the piecemeal and episodic review that results from 
litigation.”294 
Instead of the public learning of egregious violations once things 
become so out of control,295 oversight and transparency can provide 
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an ongoing glimpse into the daily operations of prisons.  This will not 
only increase public awareness, but will also have a deterrent effect.  
Prison officials, knowing that their actions and non-action will be 
publicly scrutinized, will have an incentive to operate their facilities 
in substantial compliance with the law.  We have the EPA to monitor 
pollution and the FDA to monitor consumer safety.  These agencies 
operate across all industries and sectors to proactively prevent bad 
behavior.296  We should dedicate equal resources to the treatment of 
human beings as we do to these other important causes. 
CONCLUSION 
Prisoners lose many rights upon incarceration, but fundamental 
human rights are not among them.  The closed nature of prisons and 
the inability of prisoners to advocate on their own behalf for 
institutional reform leads to mistreatment and abuse.297  The PLRA 
severely limits a prisoner’s ability to obtain meaningful redress for 
constitutional violations.  The goals of the PLRA—to reduce frivolity 
and improve the quality of prisoner suits—can be accomplished 
through less restrictive means, without amending or repealing the 
legislation.  Addressing the conflict of interests in the current 
administrative remedy procedure will foster greater trust in the 
system.  Recognizing exceptions to the proper exhaustion rule will 
allow meritorious claims to proceed, and remove the incentive for 
prison officials to summarily dismiss them.  Ongoing oversight and 
monitoring will promote accountability and lead to safer and more 
humane institutions.  It is time to expose the “hidden world of 
punishment,” and to end the “rationing of justice” in American 
prisons. 
EPILOGUE 
Shortly after the completion of this Comment, the United States 
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landmark opinion with respect to prisoner litigation, that both 
supports and validates the analysis and recommendations set forth 
herein.  Blake v. Ross,298 a case that exemplifies many of the 
procedurally defaulted cases since Woodford’s “proper exhaustion” 
requirement, presented the appellate court with an opportunity to 
interpret a meaningful exception to the rigid “proper exhaustion” 
rule. 
On June 21, 2007, Michael Ross and James Madigan, lieutenants 
with the Maryland Division of Correction (MDOC), moved Shaidon 
Blake, a prisoner committed to the MDOC, from his cell to another 
cell block.299  The officers retrieved Blake from his cell, and 
handcuffed Blake’s hands behind his back.300  As the three men 
proceeded to Blake’s new cell block, Madigan verbally harassed and 
physically shoved Blake multiple times.301  The three men reached 
the door to the new cellblock when Madigan ordered Blake to stand 
against the wall.302  “With Ross still holding Blake against the wall, 
Madigan wrapped a key ring around his fingers and then punched 
Blake at least four times in the face in quick succession.  Madigan 
paused briefly, then punched Blake in the face again.”303  Madigan 
and Ross then took Blake to the ground and restrained him until 
backup arrived.304  As a result of this attack, Blake suffered numerous 
injuries, including permanent nerve damage.305 
Later that day, Blake filed a written report with senior corrections 
officers.306  The Internal Investigative Unit (IIU), the prison’s own 
investigative unit, conducted a yearlong investigation of the incident 
and issued a formal report, concluding that Madigan indeed “used 
excessive force against Blake by striking him in the face while he 
was handcuffed.”307  This report prompted the MDOC to issue 
Madigan an Unsatisfactory Report of Service and relieve him of his 
duties.308 
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On September 8, 2009, Blake filed a Section 1983 claim against 
Ross and Madigan.309  Ross raised the affirmative defense of failure 
to properly exhaust all available administrative remedies.310  
Madigan, however, did not raise this defense, and Blake ultimately 
prevailed against Madigan at trial.311  Regarding Blake’s claim 
against Ross, the District Court granted Ross summary judgment 
finding that Blake failed to properly exhaust his administrative 
remedies.312  Blake appealed the court’s ruling, presenting the 
following question on appeal:  Whether Blake satisfied the PLRA’s 
exhaustion requirement by complying with the IIU investigation?313 
It is undisputed that Blake never filed a grievance through the 
internal administrative remedy procedure as required by MDOC 
regulations.314  Blake argued that IIU’s investigation of this incident 
removed his grievance from the administrative process 
requirements.315  The court then methodically laid the foundation for 
interpreting an administrative exception to the doctrine of “proper 
exhaustion.” 
First, the court recognized the primary purposes of the PLRA’s 
exhaustion requirement: (1) to give prisons a chance to internally 
address complaints; (2) to reduce litigation; and (3) to improve the 
quality of the litigation.316  The exhaustion requirement, the court 
noted, is not absolute.317 
Second, the court recognized Justice Breyer’s concurrence in 
Woodford, which discussed “well-established exceptions” to the 
“proper exhaustion” requirement, and the Second Circuit’s decision 
in Giano v. Goord,318 applying such an exception.319 
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Third, the court adopted the Second Circuit’s two-pronged analysis 
regarding the availability of an administrative exception to the 
exhaustion requirement.320  This inquiry first examines whether the 
prisoner procedurally exhausted his remedies—was the prisoner 
“justified in believing” that his efforts in exhausting his claim were 
satisfactory because the prison’s system was too confusing?321  The 
inquiry then assesses the substantive aspect of the prisoner’s 
exhaustion attempt—did the prisoner’s actual complaint exhaust his 
remedies “in a substantive sense” by allowing the prison to resolve 
the matter internally?322  The Fourth Circuit accepted this formulation 
as striking “the appropriate balance between statutory purpose and 
our administrative jurisprudence.”323 
Regarding the procedural prong, the court found that the rules were 
sufficiently vague to justify (or at least not contradict) Blake’s belief 
that by reporting the incident to prison administrators, and by IIU 
conducting an investigation, Blake had properly exhausted his 
administrative remedies in a procedural sense.324 
Substantively, the court found that Blake “clearly” satisfied the 
exhaustion requirements because the MDOC conducted a yearlong 
investigation and ultimately fired Madigan.325  The court held that the 
MDOC had notice of the complaint, and a chance to develop an 
“extensive record” and resolve the dispute internally without a need 
for litigation, thus satisfying the primary purposes of the exhaustion 
requirement.326 
The court ultimately concluded that “Blake reasonably interpreted 
Maryland’s murky inmate grievance procedures, and the IIU 
investigation into his complaint provided the Department with ample 
notice and opportunity to address internally the issues raised.”327 
The balance recognized by the Fourth Circuit—ensuring that a pro 
se prisoner litigant will not be penalized for making a good faith, but 
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flawed, attempt at administrative compliance, with preserving a 
prison from unnecessary and unexpected litigation—mimics this 
Comment’s suggestions in Part IV.328 
The Blake decision not only embodies Justice Breyer’s conception 
of a judicially crafted administrative exception to “proper 
exhaustion;” it demonstrates that such an option is viable in its 
application, and suitable in the pursuit of justice. 
The Fourth Circuit is the first federal appellate court to adopt the 
Hemphill framework,329 as further articulated in Giano,330 thereby 
interpreting an administrative exception to the “proper exhaustion” 
rule.  This is significant for many reasons.  Most importantly, Blake 
creates strong precedent for the application of this exception by 
federal courts on a case by case basis.  This adapted methodology of 
determining “proper exhaustion” will ensure that prisoners with 
legitimate complaints will have those matters decided on the merits, 
rather than summarily dismissed for procedural reasons.  If a claim is 
procedurally defaulted and the prisoner can demonstrate that the 
Hemphill/Giano/Blake guidelines were satisfied, a federal court now 
has precedent (and a diagramed framework) to apply an exception to 
“proper exhaustion.”   
Blake also supports the notion, as suggested by this Comment, that 
“proper exhaustion” and meaningful redress for constitutional 
violations can indeed coexist without requiring a full repeal of the 
PLRA.  Blake should lead the way for a federal movement toward a 
more pragmatic and fact-based approach to individual prisoner 
claims, ensuring that these claims are decided on their merits.  Blake 
represents an important paradigm shift in the way that federal courts 
approach prisoner litigation and apply the PLRA’s requirements, and 
should further help pierce the “iron curtain” that has been redrawn 
between prisoners and their ability to vindicate constitutional 
violations.   
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